写真a

MIYAKAWA Tosiji

Position

Professor

Mail Address

E-mail address

External Link

Graduating School 【 display / non-display

  • Kwansei Gakuin University   Faculty of Economics   Graduated

    1989.4 - 1993.3

Graduate School 【 display / non-display

  • Kwansei Gakuin University   Graduate School, Division of Economics   Doctor's Course   Completed

    1993.4

Campus Career 【 display / non-display

  • KONAN UNIVERSITY   Faculty of Economics   Faculty of Economics Department of Economics   Professor

    2020.4

External Career 【 display / non-display

  • Pennsylvania State University

    2009.8 - 2010.8

      More details

    Country:United States

 

Papers 【 display / non-display

  • Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values Reviewed

    Yuji Fujinaka, Toshiji Miyakawa

    Journal of Mathematical Economics   91   157 - 164   2020.9

     More details

    Joint Work

    Publisher:Elsevier  

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.002

  • Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities Reviewed

    Tomohiko Kawamori, Toshiji Miyakawa

    Economics Letters   183   2019

     More details

  • Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations Reviewed

    Tomohiko Kawamori, Toshiji Miyakawa

    Operations Research Letters   45   427 - 430   2017.7

     More details

    Joint Work

    researchmap

  • The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information Reviewed

    Toshiji Miyakawa

    Social Choice and Welfare   49   205 - 229   2017.5

     More details

    Single Work

    researchmap

  • Nash bargaining solution under externalities Reviewed

    Tomohiko Kawamori, Toshiji Miyakawa

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   84   1 - 7   2016.11

     More details

    Joint Work

    Publisher:ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV  

    We define a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) of partition function games. Based on a partition function game, we define an extensive game, which is a propose-respond sequential bargaining game where the rejecter of a proposal exits from the game with some positive probability. We show that the NBS is supported as the expected payoff profile of any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) of the extensive game such that in any subgame, a coalition of all active players forms immediately. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for such an SSPE to exist. Moreover, we consider extensions to the cases of nontransferable utilities, time discounting and multiple-coalition formation. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.001

    researchmap

display all >>

Books and Other Publications 【 display / non-display

  • ゲーム理論ワークブック

    岡田章、加茂知幸、三上和彦、宮川敏治( Role: Joint author)

    有斐閣  2015.12 

  • 森嶋通夫著作集5『需要理論:実物と金融』

    入谷純、加茂知幸、宮川敏治、吉田建夫( Role: Joint translator)

    岩波書店  2004.7 

Presentations 【 display / non-display

  • Do workers negotiate collectively or separately? An application of coalitional bargaining game with externalties

    Fumi Kiyotaki, Toshiji Miyakawa

    European meeting of Econometric Society  (Lisbon, Portugal) 

     More details

    Event date: 2017.8

    researchmap

  • Do workers negotiate collectively or separately? An application of coalitional bargaining game with externalities

    Fumi Kiyotaki a, Toshiji Miyakawa

    SING 13(European meeting on game theory)  (Paris, France) 

     More details

    Event date: 2017.7

    researchmap

  • Nash bargaining solution under externalities

    Tomohiko Kawamori

    European meeting of Econometric Society  (Gothenburg, Sweden) 

     More details

    Event date: 2013.8

    researchmap

  • Nash Bargaining Solution, Core and Coalitional Bargaining Game with Inside Options

    Fourth Congress of the Game Theory Society, Istanbul, Turkey 

     More details

    Event date: 2012

    researchmap

  • Noncooperative foundation of Nash bargaining solution in n-person games with incomplete information

    21st international conference on game theory at Stony Brook University US 

     More details

    Event date: 2010

    researchmap

display all >>