Papers - OSANO Hirosi
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Optimal contracts for central bankers and public debt policy
H Fujiki, H Osano, H Uchida
JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW 55 ( 4 ) 372 - 400 2004.12
Joint Work
Publisher：BLACKWELL PUBL LTD
We consider how the second-best allocation corresponding to an optimal rule under the policy commitment of a central bank and a fiscal authority with a consolidated government budget constraint can be achieved, even though these authorities are unable to commit themselves to their optimal policies and ignore the strategic interaction between their policies. Our results show that the best practical institutional arrangement is to have an instrument-independent central bank that controls the money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to an inflation target that depends on fiscal variables.
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Stock options and employees' firm-specific human capital under the threat of divestitures and acquisitions
H Osano
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 10 ( 4 ) 615 - 638 2004.9
Single Work
Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
This paper considers whether the first-best level of firm-specific human capital investment is attained by the use of stock option plans for workers and stock offers in acquisitions even though workers are threatened with the possibility of a divestiture and acquisition. We show that the first-best level of investment is achieved by a stock option plan with a positive exercise price for workers conditional on the event of a divestiture. We also suggest that, under certain conditions, a stock offer in acquisition can resolve a collusion problem between the target firm (TF) and its workers. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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コーポレート・ガバナンス変革と労働
小佐野 広
（小林磨美氏と共著）Japan Labor Review, Vol. 2, pp. 58-80, 2004 2004
Single Work
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Wealth dynamics and the endogenous design of firm organization
H Osano
JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW 54 ( 3 ) 300 - 323 2003.9
Single Work
Publisher：BLACKWELL PUBL LTD
The purpose of this paper is to explore a dynamic interaction between wealth distribution and firm organization design using a model of growth in altruism in which a consideration of moral hazard on the part of agents with risk-averse preferences prevents complete insurance and generates inequality. I show (i) that there exists an ergodic invariant distribution of wealth to which the stochastic process of lineage wealth converges globally, and (ii) that the firm form with direct evaluation of the agent's effort is more likely to be chosen as wealth is distributed more equally.
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Lender Liability and Cleanup Procedure: A Comparison
Mami Kobayashi, yoto Universi, Hiroshi Osano
Journal of Economic Research, Vol. 8, pp. 169-178 2003
Joint Work
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日本における銀行モニタリングのガバナンス機能
小佐野広, 内田浩史
『コーポレート・ガバナンスの経済分析：変革期の日本と金融危機後の東アジア』（東京大学出版会） 寺西重郎・花崎正晴編 2003
Joint Work
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メインバンク・企業間の資金調達関係と株式持ち合い (特集 コーポレート・ファイナンス)
小佐野 広, 堀 敬一
証券アナリストジャ-ナル 40 ( 12 ) 60 - 72 2002.12
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Managerial compensation contract and bank bailout policy
H Osano
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE 26 ( 1 ) 25 - 49 2002.1
Single Work
Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Under the incomplete contract framework, we consider an optimal regulatory policy for motivating bank equity owners and bank managers to restructure the bad loans of their banks in the presence of managerial compensation contracts with stock options. The regulatory policy studied in this paper is mainly concerned with the design of repayment schedules in the scheme of injection of cash funds into insolvent banks by the regulator. We show that the regulator cannot necessarily attain the social optimal allocation by injecting cash funds into insolvent banks through the purchase of subordinated bonds with the risk-Free interest rate. However, even in that case, we also suggest that, if the regulator injects cash funds into active restructuring banks through the purchase of subordinated bonds or preferred stocks with less stringent repayment conditions and nationalizes passive restructuring banks, the regulator can attain the social optimal allocation by performing such a non-linear injection scheme under certain conditions. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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日本企業の資金調達とガバナンス：規制緩和と持合解消のインパクト
小佐野広, 堀敬一, 立命
『日本企業選択期の変革』 （東洋経済新報社）伊藤秀史編 2002
Joint Work
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Injection of Public Funds into Banks under Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation
Hiroshi Osano
Banking, Capital Markets, and Corporate Governance, Hiroshi Osano and Toshiaki Tachibanaki (eds.), Palgrave, New York 2001
Single Work
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Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal\\'s renegotiation offer
H. Osano
Review of Economic Design 4 ( 2 ) 161 - 177 1999
Single Work
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Security Design, Insider Monitoring, and Financial Market Equilibrium
小佐野 広
Review of Finance,2/,273-302 1999
Single Work
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Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer
H Osano
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION 37 ( 2 ) 207 - 230 1998.10
Single Work
Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for implementing the desired equilibrium actions in the one-principal, multi-agent model with renegotiation when each agent is allowed to make a renegotiation offer. With some belief restriction, we show that there exists a mechanism in which the second-best strategy is always implemented. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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Default and renegotiation in financial distress in the multiple bank model: An analysis of the main bank system
H. Osano
Japanese Economic Review 49 ( 2 ) 138 - 157 1998
Single Work
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An evolutionary model of corporate governance and employment contracts
H Osano
JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES 11 ( 3 ) 403 - 436 1997.9
Single Work
Publisher：ACADEMIC PRESS INC JNL-COMP SUBSCRIPTIONS
The purpose of this paper is to consider what determines the differences between the combinations of financial and labor systems observed in some large market economies. In the presence of complementarity relations between financial and labor systems, we first show that the American type of financial and labor systems and the Japanese type of financial and labor systems coexist. On the basis of the evolutionary approach, we then discuss which equilibrium is more plausible for different parameter values of the environment. We also explore how the evolutionary outcome depends upon changes in the parametric conditions. These evolutionary analyses give an explanation for the transformation of the Japanese economic system from the market-oriented financial and labor systems in the prewar era to the main bank and long-term employment systems in the postwar era. J. Japan. Inr. Econ., September 1997, 11(3), pp. 403-436. Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Ryoto, Japan. (C) 1997 Academic Press.