Papers - OSANO Hirosi
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Information production in start-up firms: SPACs vs. Traditional IPOs Reviewed
Keiichi Hori and Hiroshi Osano
Journal of Corporate Finance 85 2024.4
Authorship：Corresponding author
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Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion Reviewed
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 111 2020.2
Joint Work
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. We explore how the timings of compensation payments and contract terminations are jointly determined in a continuous-time principal–agent model under the discretionary termination policy of investors (the principal) when the manager (agent) has loss–averse preferences. Our theoretical findings provide several new empirical implications for backloaded compensation and forced managerial turnover. Our model also shows that mandatory deferral regulation governing incentive pay induces investors to terminate the contract relation earlier and results in the more frequent replacement of managers.
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Credit Default Swaps and Market Information Reviewed
OSANO Hiroshi
Journal of Financial Markets 48 2020
Single Work
Authorship：Lead author, Last author, Corresponding author
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. In this paper, I theoretically explore the effects of the interaction between the information transmission role and the empty creditor problem of credit default swaps (CDSs) under debt rollover. Contrary to the empty creditor argument, the introduction of CDS protection increases the possibility of out-of-court restructuring if the liquidation value is not sufficiently large. However, when it is large, the introduction of CDS protection increases the possibility of firm bankruptcy. In addition, the introduction of CDS markets impairs the efficiency of debt financing under certain conditions, particularly if the liquidation value is not sufficiently large.
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Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW 68 ( 4 ) 521 - 554 2017.12
Joint Work
Publisher：WILEY
Given that an owner lacks the ability to commit to his or her timing decisions under a manager's hidden action, we consider the optimal design of the contract and the owner's optimal timing decisions. Using a real options approach, we show that, compared with the full commitment case, a higher (lower)-quality project is launched later than (at the same time as) the first-best case, whereas the replacement of the manager is (is not necessarily) made later if the hidden-action problem is severe enough (is not severe enough). Severance pay may serve to minimize the compensation for the manager's loss of corporate control.
DOI： 10.1111/jere.12144
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Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 29 607 - 627 2014.12
Joint Work
Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
This paper considers what kind of managerial compensation contract is optimal for mitigating the moral hazard decision regarding investment timing. We examine the situation where the personal objectives of managers do not align with those of shareholders and where there is the possibility of project liquidation but where managerial compensation is endogenously determined. Using a real options approach, we show that restricted stock is optimal relative to stock options under various circumstances. However, we also suggest that stock options are more likely to be used instead of, or in addition to, restricted stock in firms with new debt financing and more impatient managers, diversified firms involving more complicated business activities, and firms with weaker corporate governance. In addition, we find that project start-up is more likely to be deterred by the greater likelihood of project liquidation and larger managerial effort cost, whereas the amount of stock-based managerial compensation is independent of the probability of liquidation but is increasing in managerial effort cost. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model (vol 26, pg 2620, 2013)
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 27 ( 12 ) 3699 - 3701 2014.12
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Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 26 ( 10 ) 2620 - 2647 2013.10
Joint Work
Publisher：OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC
We explore a continuous-time agency model with double moral hazard. Using a venture capitalist (VC)-entrepreneur relationship where the VC both supplies costly effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public offering (IPO), we show that optimal IPO timing is earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard. Our results also indicate that the manager's compensation tends to be paid earlier under double moral hazard. We derive several comparative static results, notably that IPO timing is earlier when the need for monitoring by the VC is smaller and when the volatility of cash flows is larger.
DOI： 10.1093/rfs/hht027
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Nonrecourse financing and securitization
Mami Kobayashi, Hiroshi Osano
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 21 ( 4 ) 659 - 693 2012.10
Joint Work
Publisher：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
We consider the role of the nonrecourse financing of securitization by a financial institution (FI). Our model suggests that even though the FI has the opportunity to provide liquidity support afterward, it is optimal for the FI to use the nonrecourse financing of securitization initially, because the nonrecourse security makes liquidation of the original asset more attractive for an Fl that knows that the original asset is bad. However, our model also predicts that the nonrecourse financing of securitization, together with short-term maturity financing, forces the financial system to perform inefficiently in handling troubled loans and causes problems with inefficient liquidity support and overinvestment under certain conditions, despite the nonrecourse property of securitization. The theoretical results provide empirical implications for recent problems with securitized and structured finance in the United States and Europe. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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The new main bank system
Mami Kobayashi, Hiroshi Osano
JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES 25 ( 3 ) 336 - 354 2011.9
Joint Work
Publisher：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Kobayashi, Mami, and Osano, Hiroshi-The new main bank system
We develop a main bank model where the main bank decides whether or not to raise additional funds from the capital market to continue to invest in a borrowing firm when nonmain banks withdraw funds. We show that the threat of withdrawal of nonmain banks is more likely to force the main bank to perform efficiently in handling troubled loans, thereby preventing problems with zombie firms, if the potential cash flow (liquidation value) of the firm decreases (increases) relative to the amount funded by nonmain banks. The theoretical results provide both efficiency evaluations for the renewal of the main bank relation in Japan after the end of the 1990s and empirical implications for the renewed main bank system. J. Japanese Int. Economies xxx (xx) (2011) xxx-xxx. Faculty of Economics, Kindai University, Japan; Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. -
Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources
Hiroshi Osano
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 167 ( 2 ) 202 - 223 2011.6
Single Work
Publisher：J C B MOHR
This paper considers the role of equity transfer to strategic alliance partners in mitigating the moral-hazard problem that occurs if a participating firm faces some possibility of reallocating a part of the resources devoted to the joint project of the strategic alliance or retreating from the strategic alliance before completing the joint project. I derive a situation in which equity transfer in the strategic alliance is a component of an optimal contract, in particular, in which equity transfer in the strategic alliance is superior to the contract with the cash transfer only. I also analyze optimal equity stake sizes.
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Incentive Transfer Schemes with Marketable and Nonmarketable Public Services
Nobuo Akai, Keizo Mizuno, Hiroshi Osano
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 166 ( 4 ) 614 - 640 2010.12
Joint Work
Publisher：J C B MOHR
We examine an incentive transfer scheme in an executive agency system when there are both marketable and nonmarketable public services. We show that because of the incentive transfer scheme, which contributes to the elimination of a government's budget deficit, social welfare is higher in the executive agency system than in a traditional system when the shadow cost of public funds is large. In addition, the scheme is desirable from a welfare viewpoint when the marketable and nonmarketable public services are complements, or when the production technology exhibits a high degree of cost complementarity. (JEL: H 11, L 32)
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Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems
K. Hori, H. Osano
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33 ( 12 ) 1962 - 1980 2009.12
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Reforming corporate Governance and Employment Relations
Mami Kobayashi, Kindai University, Hiroshi Osano
Employment Relations: Changing Scenario, Bharti Thakor ed (ed.) 2008
Joint Work
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証券化,内部モニタリング, 金融市場
小佐野広
Ruud. A. I. van Frederikslust, James S. Ang and Sudi Sudarsanam (eds.) Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance, Routledge Books, 2007 2007
Single Work
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Optimal Scheme of Injection of Public Funds Under Moral Hazard Incentive for Banks
Hiroshi Osano
The Japanese Economic Review, Vol.56, pp.223-247 2005
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On Executive Agency Systems
Keizo Mizuno, ansei Gakuin University, Nobuo Akai, Osaka Unuiversity, Hiroshi Osano
Osaka Economic Papers, Vol.55, pp.153-159 2005
Joint Work
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Double moral hazard and renegotiation
H. Osano, M. Kobayashi
Research in Economics 59 ( 4 ) 345 - 364 2005
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Reformong Corporate Governance and employment Relations
Mami Kobayashi, Kinki University, Hiroshi Osano
Japan Labor Review, Vol.2, pp. 58-80 2005
Joint Work
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Optimal contracts for central bankers and public debt policy
H Fujiki, H Osano, H Uchida
JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW 55 ( 4 ) 372 - 400 2004.12
Joint Work
Publisher：BLACKWELL PUBL LTD
We consider how the second-best allocation corresponding to an optimal rule under the policy commitment of a central bank and a fiscal authority with a consolidated government budget constraint can be achieved, even though these authorities are unable to commit themselves to their optimal policies and ignore the strategic interaction between their policies. Our results show that the best practical institutional arrangement is to have an instrument-independent central bank that controls the money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to an inflation target that depends on fiscal variables.
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Stock options and employees' firm-specific human capital under the threat of divestitures and acquisitions
H Osano
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 10 ( 4 ) 615 - 638 2004.9
Single Work
Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
This paper considers whether the first-best level of firm-specific human capital investment is attained by the use of stock option plans for workers and stock offers in acquisitions even though workers are threatened with the possibility of a divestiture and acquisition. We show that the first-best level of investment is achieved by a stock option plan with a positive exercise price for workers conditional on the event of a divestiture. We also suggest that, under certain conditions, a stock offer in acquisition can resolve a collusion problem between the target firm (TF) and its workers. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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コーポレート・ガバナンス変革と労働
小佐野 広
（小林磨美氏と共著）Japan Labor Review, Vol. 2, pp. 58-80, 2004 2004
Single Work
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Wealth dynamics and the endogenous design of firm organization
H Osano
JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW 54 ( 3 ) 300 - 323 2003.9
Single Work
Publisher：BLACKWELL PUBL LTD
The purpose of this paper is to explore a dynamic interaction between wealth distribution and firm organization design using a model of growth in altruism in which a consideration of moral hazard on the part of agents with risk-averse preferences prevents complete insurance and generates inequality. I show (i) that there exists an ergodic invariant distribution of wealth to which the stochastic process of lineage wealth converges globally, and (ii) that the firm form with direct evaluation of the agent's effort is more likely to be chosen as wealth is distributed more equally.
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Lender Liability and Cleanup Procedure: A Comparison
Mami Kobayashi, yoto Universi, Hiroshi Osano
Journal of Economic Research, Vol. 8, pp. 169-178 2003
Joint Work
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日本における銀行モニタリングのガバナンス機能
小佐野広, 内田浩史
『コーポレート・ガバナンスの経済分析：変革期の日本と金融危機後の東アジア』（東京大学出版会） 寺西重郎・花崎正晴編 2003
Joint Work
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メインバンク・企業間の資金調達関係と株式持ち合い (特集 コーポレート・ファイナンス)
小佐野 広, 堀 敬一
証券アナリストジャ-ナル 40 ( 12 ) 60 - 72 2002.12
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Managerial compensation contract and bank bailout policy
H Osano
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE 26 ( 1 ) 25 - 49 2002.1
Single Work
Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Under the incomplete contract framework, we consider an optimal regulatory policy for motivating bank equity owners and bank managers to restructure the bad loans of their banks in the presence of managerial compensation contracts with stock options. The regulatory policy studied in this paper is mainly concerned with the design of repayment schedules in the scheme of injection of cash funds into insolvent banks by the regulator. We show that the regulator cannot necessarily attain the social optimal allocation by injecting cash funds into insolvent banks through the purchase of subordinated bonds with the risk-Free interest rate. However, even in that case, we also suggest that, if the regulator injects cash funds into active restructuring banks through the purchase of subordinated bonds or preferred stocks with less stringent repayment conditions and nationalizes passive restructuring banks, the regulator can attain the social optimal allocation by performing such a non-linear injection scheme under certain conditions. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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日本企業の資金調達とガバナンス：規制緩和と持合解消のインパクト
小佐野広, 堀敬一, 立命
『日本企業選択期の変革』 （東洋経済新報社）伊藤秀史編 2002
Joint Work
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Injection of Public Funds into Banks under Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation
Hiroshi Osano
Banking, Capital Markets, and Corporate Governance, Hiroshi Osano and Toshiaki Tachibanaki (eds.), Palgrave, New York 2001
Single Work
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Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal\\'s renegotiation offer
H. Osano
Review of Economic Design 4 ( 2 ) 161 - 177 1999
Single Work
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Security Design, Insider Monitoring, and Financial Market Equilibrium
小佐野 広
Review of Finance,2/,273-302 1999
Single Work
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Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer
H Osano
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION 37 ( 2 ) 207 - 230 1998.10
Single Work
Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for implementing the desired equilibrium actions in the one-principal, multi-agent model with renegotiation when each agent is allowed to make a renegotiation offer. With some belief restriction, we show that there exists a mechanism in which the second-best strategy is always implemented. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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Default and renegotiation in financial distress in the multiple bank model: An analysis of the main bank system
H. Osano
Japanese Economic Review 49 ( 2 ) 138 - 157 1998
Single Work
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An evolutionary model of corporate governance and employment contracts
H Osano
JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES 11 ( 3 ) 403 - 436 1997.9
Single Work
Publisher：ACADEMIC PRESS INC JNL-COMP SUBSCRIPTIONS
The purpose of this paper is to consider what determines the differences between the combinations of financial and labor systems observed in some large market economies. In the presence of complementarity relations between financial and labor systems, we first show that the American type of financial and labor systems and the Japanese type of financial and labor systems coexist. On the basis of the evolutionary approach, we then discuss which equilibrium is more plausible for different parameter values of the environment. We also explore how the evolutionary outcome depends upon changes in the parametric conditions. These evolutionary analyses give an explanation for the transformation of the Japanese economic system from the market-oriented financial and labor systems in the prewar era to the main bank and long-term employment systems in the postwar era. J. Japan. Inr. Econ., September 1997, 11(3), pp. 403-436. Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Ryoto, Japan. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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Intercorporate shareholdings and corporate control in the Japanese firm
H Osano
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE 20 ( 6 ) 1047 - 1068 1996.7
Single Work
Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
The purpose of this paper is to specify a formal model that rationalizes the intercorporate shareholdings observed in the Japanese equity market as a mechanism for mutual commitment and risk sharing that creates greater possibilities to resolve managerial myopic problems caused by the threat of external takeovers. We show that, under certain conditions, all agents including the existing shareholders of the firm are strictly better off when participating in an implicit contract associated with intercorporate shareholdings. The results also suggest chat intercorporate ownership raises the stock prices of the member firms.
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RENEGOTIATION-PROOF LOTTERIES EQUILIBRIUM IN AN ECONOMY WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION
H OSANO
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 65 ( 2 ) 435 - 467 1995.4
Single Work
Publisher：ACADEMIC PRESS INC JNL-COMP SUBSCRIPTIONS
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether the standard results of classical general equilibrium theory still hold in private information economies where the possibility of renegotiation of initial contracts (lotteries) is allowed. We establish that competitive equilibria with contracts (lotteries) exist and are optimal for the class of private information economies in which principal-agent problems are characterized by moral hazard and renegotiation-proof contracts (lotteries). We also show that financial intermediaries arise endogenously in this environment: financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement which is needed to support the competitive equilibrium allocations of our private information economy. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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"Main Bank System, Implicit Contracts and Trust in Deferred Payment Arrangements," Labour Market and Economic Performance: Europe
Hiroshi Osano, Toshio Serita, Aoyama Gakuin Univ
Japan and the USA, Toshiaki Tachibanaki (ed.), Macmillan, London, pp.312-346 1994
Joint Work
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Basic Research and Applied R & D in a Model of Endogenous Economic Growth
Hiroshi Osano
大阪大學經濟學 42 ( 1 ) 144 - 167 1992
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TESTING BETWEEN COMPETING MODELS OF REAL BUSINESS CYCLES
OSANO, H, INOUE, T
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW 32 ( 3 ) 669 - 688 1991.8
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Coordination Failure and Economic Growth
Hiroshi Osano
Osaka Economic Papers, Vol.40 1991
Single Work
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DYNAMIC LABOR CONTRACTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
H OSANO
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 50 ( 1 ) 175 - 192 1990.2
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Coordination Failure and Long Run Growth
小佐野 広
大阪大學經濟學 40 ( 1 ) 102 - 125 1990
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Implicit contracts in the Japanese labor market
H. Osano, T. Inoue
Journal of The Japanese and International Economies 2 ( 2 ) 181 - 198 1988
Joint Work
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Social Security and Lifetime Employment Contract
小佐野 広
Economic Studies Quarterly,38/2 1987
Single Work
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Credit rationing and implicit contract theory. An empirical study
H. Osano, Y. Tsutsui
International Journal of Industrial Organization 4 ( 4 ) 419 - 438 1986
Joint Work
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IMPLICIT CONTRACTS IN THE JAPANESE BANK LOAN MARKET
H OSANO, Y TSUTSUI
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 20 ( 2 ) 211 - 229 1985
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Price decision and Capacity Investment of Public Utilities Under Uncertainty
小佐野 広
Economic Studies Quarterly,35/1 1984
Single Work
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The Structural Stability of an Implicit Labor Contract System
小佐野 広
Economic Studies Quarterly,34/2 1983
Single Work
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一般均衡モデルとしての暗黙の労働契約理論 (渡辺太郎博士還暦記念論文集)
本間 正明, 小佐野 広
大阪大学経済学 31 ( 2 ) 163 - 178 1981.12
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新聞産業における非価格競争と,ABC部数のインセンティブ効果
小佐野広
大阪大学経済学 31 ( 1 ) 10 - 20 1981.6