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特任教授 |
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Humanities & Social Sciences / Economic theory, Humanities & Social Sciences / Money and finance, Humanities & Social Sciences / Public economics and labor economics |
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Graduating School 【 display / non-display 】
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Kyoto University Faculty of Economics Graduated
1974.4 - 1978.3
Graduate School 【 display / non-display 】
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Osaka University Graduate School, Division of Economics Doctor's Course Accomplished credits for doctoral program
1978.4 - 1982.3
Campus Career 【 display / non-display 】
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KONAN UNIVERSITY Faculty of Economics Faculty of Economics Department of Economics 特任教授
2020.4
External Career 【 display / non-display 】
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京都大学
2020.4
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Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
2015.1 - 2016.1
Country：Australia
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日本銀行 金融経済研究所
2007.3 - 2009.2
Country：Japan
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Ohio State University
2001.3 - 2002.1
Country：United States
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京都大学 経済研究所
1997.7 - 2020.3
Country：Japan
Papers 【 display / non-display 】
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Information production in start-up firms: SPACs vs. Traditional IPOs Reviewed
Keiichi Hori and Hiroshi Osano
Journal of Corporate Finance 85 2024.4
Authorship：Corresponding author
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Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion Reviewed
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 111 2020.2
Joint Work
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. We explore how the timings of compensation payments and contract terminations are jointly determined in a continuous-time principal–agent model under the discretionary termination policy of investors (the principal) when the manager (agent) has loss–averse preferences. Our theoretical findings provide several new empirical implications for backloaded compensation and forced managerial turnover. Our model also shows that mandatory deferral regulation governing incentive pay induces investors to terminate the contract relation earlier and results in the more frequent replacement of managers.
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Credit Default Swaps and Market Information Reviewed
OSANO Hiroshi
Journal of Financial Markets 48 2020
Single Work
Authorship：Lead author, Last author, Corresponding author
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. In this paper, I theoretically explore the effects of the interaction between the information transmission role and the empty creditor problem of credit default swaps (CDSs) under debt rollover. Contrary to the empty creditor argument, the introduction of CDS protection increases the possibility of out-of-court restructuring if the liquidation value is not sufficiently large. However, when it is large, the introduction of CDS protection increases the possibility of firm bankruptcy. In addition, the introduction of CDS markets impairs the efficiency of debt financing under certain conditions, particularly if the liquidation value is not sufficiently large.
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Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW 68 ( 4 ) 521 - 554 2017.12
Joint Work
Publisher：WILEY
Given that an owner lacks the ability to commit to his or her timing decisions under a manager's hidden action, we consider the optimal design of the contract and the owner's optimal timing decisions. Using a real options approach, we show that, compared with the full commitment case, a higher (lower)-quality project is launched later than (at the same time as) the first-best case, whereas the replacement of the manager is (is not necessarily) made later if the hidden-action problem is severe enough (is not severe enough). Severance pay may serve to minimize the compensation for the manager's loss of corporate control.
DOI： 10.1111/jere.12144
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Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 29 607 - 627 2014.12
Joint Work
Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
This paper considers what kind of managerial compensation contract is optimal for mitigating the moral hazard decision regarding investment timing. We examine the situation where the personal objectives of managers do not align with those of shareholders and where there is the possibility of project liquidation but where managerial compensation is endogenously determined. Using a real options approach, we show that restricted stock is optimal relative to stock options under various circumstances. However, we also suggest that stock options are more likely to be used instead of, or in addition to, restricted stock in firms with new debt financing and more impatient managers, diversified firms involving more complicated business activities, and firms with weaker corporate governance. In addition, we find that project start-up is more likely to be deterred by the greater likelihood of project liquidation and larger managerial effort cost, whereas the amount of stock-based managerial compensation is independent of the probability of liquidation but is increasing in managerial effort cost. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Books and Other Publications 【 display / non-display 】
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Managers' Investment Timing Decisions under Endogenous Compensation Contracts
Keiichi Hori, Ritsumeika University, Hiroshi Osano
SSRN, Working Paper, 2009 (Revised, 2010) 2009
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Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security Design under Securitization
Hiroshi Osano
SSRN, Working Paper 2007
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Optimal Timing of Management Turnover in Agency Conflicts
Keiichi Hori, Ritsumeikan University, Hiroshi Osano
SSRN, Working Paper, 2006 (Revised, 2009) 2006
Review Papers (Misc) 【 display / non-display 】
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近視眼的株主と種類株 Invited
小佐野 広
企業統治と成長戦略 2017.3
Publishing type：Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other) Publisher：東洋経済新報社
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A Behavioral Approach with Continuous-Time Agency Models to CEO Compensation
Osano Hiroshi, Hori Keiichi
Journal of Behavioral Economics and Finance 5 ( 0 ) 252 - 255 2012
Publisher：Association of Behavioral Economics and Finance
This paper describes recent trends in CEO compensation of US and Japanese firms, a brief summary of continuous-time agency models, and some results obtained from Hori and Osano (2012) that incorporates manager’s loss aversion. Recently, CEO compensation in US still includes a base salary while the largest component of it is stock based ones such as restricted stock grants. Based on DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) that is a seminal study on continuous-time agency models, we introduce incentive compatible constraints and how the optimal contract is derived. Hori and Osano (2012) shows that the optimal CEO compensation includes a salary that is less sensitive to the firm performance.
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Security design, insider monitoring, and financial market equilibrium
Hiroshi Osano
Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance: A European Perspective 135 - 156 2007.12
© 2008 Selection and editorial matter, Ruud A. I. van Frederikslust, James S. Ang and P. Sudi Sudarsanam; individual chapters, the contributors. All rights reserved. This paper considers a problem of security design in the presence of monitoring done by a large investor to discipline the management of a firm. Since the large investor enjoys only part of the benefits generated by her monitoring activities but incurs all the associated costs, the design and amount of security need to be structured so as to motivate her to maintain an efficient level of monitoring, if no other mechanism exists to make her commit to specific levels of monitoring in advance. By assuming that the large investor takes account of the effect of the issued amount of security on the revenues received, we show that the optimal security is a debt-like security such as standard debt with a positive probability of default, or debt with call options.We also verify that the financial market equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal.
Academic Awards Received 【 display / non-display 】
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日経経済図書文化賞
2002.3 日本経済新聞社 コーポレートガバナンスの経済学
小佐野 広
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research 【 display / non-display 】
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プルーデンス政策が情報投資を通じて金融市場の不安定性や金融危機に与える影響
2021.4 - 2024.3
JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research(C)
小佐野 広, 池田 晃彦
金融市場で取引を行う市場参加者の一部が自分で情報投資を行うモデルについて、理論的なモデルを構築した。そのうえで、社会的に最適なレベルと比較して各種のプルーデンス政策が金融市場で過剰もしくは過少な情報投資のどちらをもたらすのか、また、そのことは金融危機の可能性を高めるのかということを、まず理論的なパラメーターを特定化せず一般的な形式で分析した。ここで、各種のプルーデンス政策というのは、バーゼルIII合意で導入された金融機関に対する資本規制及び流動性の規制、並びに、リーマンショックや最近のコロナショックの際に欧米各国で導入された資産の売り手や買い手に対する資産取引の補助金プログラムである。また、ピグー的な情報技術投資に対する直接的な課税および補助金政策の効果も研究した。この定性的な分析では、ある種の条件の下では、バーゼルIII合意で導入された金融機関に対する資本規制及び流動性の規制やピグー的な情報技術投資に対する直接的な課税および補助金政策の効果を明らかにすることができ。たとえば、資本規制の強化は、情報技術への過剰投資を減少させるが、市場凍結の可能性を社会的公正を最大化するレベルより引き上げてしまうというような結果を示すことができた。しかし、リーマンショックや最近のコロナショックの際に欧米各国で導入された資産の売り手や買い手に対する資産取引の補助金プログラムの効果を明確にすることができなかった。そこで、パラメーターの値を現実的に近いような値で数値化して数値計算を行ったところ、資産の買い手に対する資産取引の補助金プログラム以外のすべての政策で予想に近い結果を導出することができた。
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The Frontier of Contract Theory and Organizational Economics
2018.4 - 2023.3
JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research(A)
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The firm's financial and investment decisions under the interaction between the rollover and insolvency risks of debt
2017.4 - 2020.3
JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research(C)
Osano Hiroshi
Under the rollover risk of the firm, I investigated the interaction between the short-run liquidity uncertainty and the long-run insolvency uncertainty of the firm. In addition, I modeled the situation in which the market participants gradually learn the long-run insolvency uncertainty that is unknown in the initial period. Under this situation, I examined how the short-run liquidity uncertainty and the long-run insolvency uncertainty affect the firm's financial and investment decisions.