写真a

OSANO Hirosi

Position

特任教授

Mail Address

E-mail address

External Link

Graduating School 【 display / non-display

  • Kyoto University   Faculty of Economics   Graduated

    1974.4 - 1978.3

Graduate School 【 display / non-display

  • Osaka University   Graduate School, Division of Economics   Doctor's Course   Accomplished credits for doctoral program

    1978.4 - 1982.3

Campus Career 【 display / non-display

  • KONAN UNIVERSITY   Faculty of Economics   Faculty of Economics Department of Economics   特任教授

    2020.4

External Career 【 display / non-display

  • 京都大学

    2020.4

  • Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology

    2015.1 - 2016.1

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    Country:Australia

  • 日本銀行   金融経済研究所

    2007.3 - 2009.2

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    Country:Japan

  • Ohio State University

    2001.3 - 2002.1

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    Country:United States

  • 京都大学   経済研究所

    1997.7 - 2020.3

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    Country:Japan

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Papers 【 display / non-display

  • Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion Reviewed

    Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano

    Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control   111   2020.2

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    Joint Work

    © 2019 Elsevier B.V. We explore how the timings of compensation payments and contract terminations are jointly determined in a continuous-time principal–agent model under the discretionary termination policy of investors (the principal) when the manager (agent) has loss–averse preferences. Our theoretical findings provide several new empirical implications for backloaded compensation and forced managerial turnover. Our model also shows that mandatory deferral regulation governing incentive pay induces investors to terminate the contract relation earlier and results in the more frequent replacement of managers.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103794

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  • Credit Default Swaps and Market Information

    OSANO Hiroshi

    Journal of Financial Markets   2020

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    Single Work

    Authorship:Lead author, Last author, Corresponding author  

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  • Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options

    Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano

    JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW   68 ( 4 )   521 - 554   2017.12

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    Joint Work

    Publisher:WILEY  

    Given that an owner lacks the ability to commit to his or her timing decisions under a manager's hidden action, we consider the optimal design of the contract and the owner's optimal timing decisions. Using a real options approach, we show that, compared with the full commitment case, a higher (lower)-quality project is launched later than (at the same time as) the first-best case, whereas the replacement of the manager is (is not necessarily) made later if the hidden-action problem is severe enough (is not severe enough). Severance pay may serve to minimize the compensation for the manager's loss of corporate control.

    DOI: 10.1111/jere.12144

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  • Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts

    Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano

    JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE   29   607 - 627   2014.12

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    Joint Work

    Publisher:ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV  

    This paper considers what kind of managerial compensation contract is optimal for mitigating the moral hazard decision regarding investment timing. We examine the situation where the personal objectives of managers do not align with those of shareholders and where there is the possibility of project liquidation but where managerial compensation is endogenously determined. Using a real options approach, we show that restricted stock is optimal relative to stock options under various circumstances. However, we also suggest that stock options are more likely to be used instead of, or in addition to, restricted stock in firms with new debt financing and more impatient managers, diversified firms involving more complicated business activities, and firms with weaker corporate governance. In addition, we find that project start-up is more likely to be deterred by the greater likelihood of project liquidation and larger managerial effort cost, whereas the amount of stock-based managerial compensation is independent of the probability of liquidation but is increasing in managerial effort cost. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.013

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  • Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model (vol 26, pg 2620, 2013)

    Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano

    REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES   27 ( 12 )   3699 - 3701   2014.12

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    Joint Work

    Publisher:OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC  

    DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhu065

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Books and Other Publications 【 display / non-display

  • Acquisition Mode and Financing in Takeovers

    Hiroshi Osano

    SSRN, Working Paper  2009 

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  • Managers' Investment Timing Decisions under Endogenous Compensation Contracts

    Keiichi Hori, Ritsumeika University, Hiroshi Osano

    SSRN, Working Paper, 2009 (Revised, 2010)  2009 

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  • Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security Design under Securitization

    Hiroshi Osano

    SSRN, Working Paper  2007 

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  • Optimal Timing of Management Turnover in Agency Conflicts

    Keiichi Hori, Ritsumeikan University, Hiroshi Osano

    SSRN, Working Paper, 2006 (Revised, 2009)  2006 

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  • コーポレート・ガバナンスと人的資本

    小佐野広

    日本経済新聞社  2005  ( ISBN:4532133017

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Review Papers (Misc) 【 display / non-display

  • 近視眼的株主と種類株 Invited

    小佐野 広

    企業統治と成長戦略   2017.3

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    Publishing type:Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other)   Publisher:東洋経済新報社  

  • A Behavioral Approach with Continuous-Time Agency Models to CEO Compensation

    Osano Hiroshi, Hori Keiichi

    Journal of Behavioral Economics and Finance   5 ( 0 )   252 - 255   2012

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    Publisher:Association of Behavioral Economics and Finance  

    This paper describes recent trends in CEO compensation of US and Japanese firms, a brief summary of continuous-time agency models, and some results obtained from Hori and Osano (2012) that incorporates manager’s loss aversion. Recently, CEO compensation in US still includes a base salary while the largest component of it is stock based ones such as restricted stock grants. Based on DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) that is a seminal study on continuous-time agency models, we introduce incentive compatible constraints and how the optimal contract is derived. Hori and Osano (2012) shows that the optimal CEO compensation includes a salary that is less sensitive to the firm performance.

    CiNii Article

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  • メインバンクをめぐる新しい問題--「メイン寄せ」の理論的分析

    小佐野 広, 小林 磨美, 寺崎 真美子

    金融研究   29 ( 1 )   1 - 45   2010.1

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    Publisher:日本銀行金融研究所  

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  • Security design, insider monitoring, and financial market equilibrium

    Hiroshi Osano

    Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance: A European Perspective   135 - 156   2007.12

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    © 2008 Selection and editorial matter, Ruud A. I. van Frederikslust, James S. Ang and P. Sudi Sudarsanam; individual chapters, the contributors. All rights reserved. This paper considers a problem of security design in the presence of monitoring done by a large investor to discipline the management of a firm. Since the large investor enjoys only part of the benefits generated by her monitoring activities but incurs all the associated costs, the design and amount of security need to be structured so as to motivate her to maintain an efficient level of monitoring, if no other mechanism exists to make her commit to specific levels of monitoring in advance. By assuming that the large investor takes account of the effect of the issued amount of security on the revenues received, we show that the optimal security is a debt-like security such as standard debt with a positive probability of default, or debt with call options.We also verify that the financial market equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal.

    DOI: 10.4324/9780203940136

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  • 情報の経済学で振り返る「敵対的企業買収」 (特集 情報の経済学で振り返る2006年)

    小佐野 広

    経済セミナー   ( 622 )   16 - 19   2006.12

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    Publisher:日本評論社  

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Academic Awards Received 【 display / non-display

  • 日経経済図書文化賞

    2002.3   日本経済新聞社   コーポレートガバナンスの経済学

    小佐野 広