論文 - 宮川 敏治
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買い手に外部機会が存在する不完備情報交渉ゲーム理論の研究動向
宮川敏治
甲南経済学論集 62 ( 1・2 ) 2021年9月
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Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values 査読あり
Yuji Fujinaka, Toshiji Miyakawa
Journal of Mathematical Economics 91 157 - 164 2020年9月
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Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities 査読あり
Tomohiko Kawamori, Toshiji Miyakawa
Economics Letters 183 2019年
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Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations 査読あり
Tomohiko Kawamori, Toshiji Miyakawa
Operations Research Letters 45 427 - 430 2017年7月
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The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information 査読あり
Toshiji Miyakawa
Social Choice and Welfare 49 205 - 229 2017年5月
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Nash bargaining solution under externalities 査読あり
Tomohiko Kawamori, Toshiji Miyakawa
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES 84 1 - 7 2016年11月
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出版者・発行元：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
We define a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) of partition function games. Based on a partition function game, we define an extensive game, which is a propose-respond sequential bargaining game where the rejecter of a proposal exits from the game with some positive probability. We show that the NBS is supported as the expected payoff profile of any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) of the extensive game such that in any subgame, a coalition of all active players forms immediately. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for such an SSPE to exist. Moreover, we consider extensions to the cases of nontransferable utilities, time discounting and multiple-coalition formation. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Delayed promotion to persuade overconfident employees
Fumi Kiyotaki a, Toshiji Miyakawa
Kindai University Working Paper 2016年4月
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Do workers negotiate collectively or separately? An application of a coalitional bargaining game with externalities
Fumi Kiyotaki a, Toshiji Miyakawa
SSRN working paper 2016年4月
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A model of housing markets with interdependent values
Yuji Fujinaka
SSRN Working Paper 2015年
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Barriers to global free trade through bilateral agreements 査読あり
Fumi Kiyotaki, Toshiji Miyakawa
Review of International Economics 21 536 - 548 2013年
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The choice of organizational form under intrafirm bargaining rules 査読あり
Fumi Kiyotaki, Toshiji Miyakawa
JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES 26 ( 3 ) 369 - 392 2012年9月
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出版者・発行元：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Kiyotaki, Fumi, and Miyakawa, Toshiji-The choice of organizational form under intrafirm bargaining rules
This paper studies the choice of organizational form under incomplete contracts. We identify an organizational form with a rule of ex-post bargaining and compare four types of organization: horizontal organizations, inverted pyramidal hierarchies, pyramidal hierarchies and vertical hierarchies. We show that if the human capital investments of all members are perfectly complementary, the horizontal organization is chosen. If the investments of two players including the owner are essential, the inverted pyramidal hierarchy can occur. Pyramidal hierarchies minimize the agency cost if investments are non-firm-specific. The vertical hierarchy emerges when the owner can motivate a player who undertakes firm-specific investment by assigning him to the middle tier. We also examine who should be assigned to the middle tier in a vertical hierarchy. J. Japanese Int. Economies 26 (3) (2012) 369-392. Faculty of Economics, Kinki University, 3-4-1 Kowakae, Higashiosaka, Osaka 577-8502, Japan; Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics, 2-2-8 Osumi, Higashiyodogawa, Osaka 533-8533, Japan. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. -
Nash Bargaining Solution, Core and Coalitional Bargaining Game with Inside Options
Toshiji Miyakawa, Tomohiko Kawamori
Osaka University of Economics, Working Paper 2012年
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Noncooperative Foundation of Nash Bargaining Solution under Incomplete Information
Toshiji Miyakawa
Osaka University of Economics, Working Paper 2012年
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Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs 査読あり
Toshiji Miyakawa
ECONOMIC THEORY 39 ( 2 ) 291 - 306 2009年5月
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出版者・発行元：SPRINGER
We provide the existence theorem of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE) in a noncooperative coalitional bargaining game model with random proposers. Our model contains a bargaining situation where the coalitional game is nonsuperadditive. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-strategy SSPE satisfying the efficiency property when the discount factor is close to one. Furthermore, we provide examples where the delay in agreement occurs, even in a random-proposers model, when the game is nonsuperadditive.
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Note on the equal split solution in an n-person noncooperative bargaining game 査読あり
Toshiji Miyakawa
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES 55 ( 3 ) 281 - 291 2008年5月
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出版者・発行元：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
This note examines a noncooperative bargaining game model to implement the "equal split" solution in a transferable utility coalitional form game provided by Hart and Mas-Colell [Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A., 1996. Bargaining and value. Econometrica 64, 357-380]. We first clarify the relationship between the equal split solution and the Nash bargaining solution in a coalitional form game and extend the model to a nontransferable utility coalitional form game. We then provide a sufficient condition for generating the Nash bargaining solution payoff configuration and the equal split solution as the limit of the stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs of Hart and Mas-Colell's bargaining game when the probabilities of the breakdown of negotiations converge to zero. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Noncooperative Foundation of n-Person Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution
宮川敏治
Journal of Economics of Kwansei Gakuin University 62 ( 1 ) 1-18 2008年
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On the Bilateral Contracting Process in Economies with Externalities
Toshiji Miyakawa
Osaka University of Economics, Working Paper 2008年
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A Role of Redistribution in the Provision of Public Goods under Equal Contribution Schemes
Toshiji Miyakawa
Journal of Osaka University of Economics 58 ( 3 ) 2007年
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The Organization as a Rule of Intrafirm Bargaining
宮川敏治, 清滝ふみ
Osaka University of Economics Working Paper 2007年
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公共財の自発的供給経済での安定集合―拘束力のない合意に基づく事前交渉によるパレート効率的配分の実現について―
宮川敏治
大阪経大論集 57 ( 2 ) 67-77 2006年
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A Role of Redistribution for the Provision of Public Good in the Social Contractual State
宮川敏治
Osaka University of Economics,Working Paper 2005年
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Noncooperative Jurisdiction Formation in a Local Public Goods Economy
宮川敏治
Osaka University of Economics,Working Paper 2005年
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Inter-generational and Intra-generational Redistribution and Stability of the Golden Rule Path
宮川 敏治
Osaka University of Economics,Working Paper 2005年
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Existence of a Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in a Coalitional Bargaining Model with Non- superadditive Game
宮川 敏治
Osaka University of Economics,Working Paper 2005年
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Delay in Coalitional Bargaining with Nonsuperadditive Game
宮川 敏治
Osaka University of Economics,Working Paper 2005年
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Noncooperative Foundation of Progressive Taxation
宮川敏治
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University Discussion Paper No. 0303 2003年
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Theory of Approximation
Jun Iritani
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University Discussion Paper No. 0211 2002年9月
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A Note on the Monotone Transformation of CES Social Welfare Functions
宮川敏治, 入谷純
Kobe University Economic Review 48 48 19-28 2002年
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Pareto-improving Redistribution: The income distribution affects the private provision of public goods
宮川 敏治
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University Discussion Paper No. 0214 2002年
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