Review Papers (Misc) - OSANO Hirosi
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近視眼的株主と種類株 Invited
小佐野 広
企業統治と成長戦略 2017.3
Publishing type：Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (other) Publisher：東洋経済新報社
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A Behavioral Approach with Continuous-Time Agency Models to CEO Compensation
Osano Hiroshi, Hori Keiichi
Journal of Behavioral Economics and Finance 5 ( 0 ) 252 - 255 2012
Publisher：Association of Behavioral Economics and Finance
This paper describes recent trends in CEO compensation of US and Japanese firms, a brief summary of continuous-time agency models, and some results obtained from Hori and Osano (2012) that incorporates manager’s loss aversion. Recently, CEO compensation in US still includes a base salary while the largest component of it is stock based ones such as restricted stock grants. Based on DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) that is a seminal study on continuous-time agency models, we introduce incentive compatible constraints and how the optimal contract is derived. Hori and Osano (2012) shows that the optimal CEO compensation includes a salary that is less sensitive to the firm performance.
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Security design, insider monitoring, and financial market equilibrium
Hiroshi Osano
Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance: A European Perspective 135 - 156 2007.12
© 2008 Selection and editorial matter, Ruud A. I. van Frederikslust, James S. Ang and P. Sudi Sudarsanam; individual chapters, the contributors. All rights reserved. This paper considers a problem of security design in the presence of monitoring done by a large investor to discipline the management of a firm. Since the large investor enjoys only part of the benefits generated by her monitoring activities but incurs all the associated costs, the design and amount of security need to be structured so as to motivate her to maintain an efficient level of monitoring, if no other mechanism exists to make her commit to specific levels of monitoring in advance. By assuming that the large investor takes account of the effect of the issued amount of security on the revenues received, we show that the optimal security is a debt-like security such as standard debt with a positive probability of default, or debt with call options.We also verify that the financial market equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal.
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コーポレート・ガバナンスと労働システム (コーポレート・ガバナンス特集(2)宮島英昭早稲田大学商学部教授責任編集)
小佐野 広, 小林 磨美
フィナンシャル・レビュー ( 68 ) 139 - 155 2003.12
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Dynamic asset investment analysis of Japanese life insurance companies under regulations
Yuichi Fukuta, Hiroshi Osano
Problems and Perspectives in Management 1 ( 1 ) 42 - 57 2003
The purpose of this paper is to give the estimation framework for considering whether or not regulatory constraints imposed on the Japanese life insurance industry can explain the behavior of Japanese life insurance companies with respect to their asset investment and dividend policies.
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Impact of a Change in Corporate Governance on Employment Relationships
OSANO Hiroshi
The Monthly journal of the Japan Institute of Labour 44 ( 10 ) 33 - 43 2002.10
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Breach of Contracts and Renegotiation in Corporate Takeovers
OSANO Hiroshi
Japanese Economic Review 47 ( 4 ) 346 - 367 1996.12
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小佐 野広
The Economic Studies Quarterly 43 ( 3 ) 287 - 288 1992
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Testing between Competing Models of Real Business Cycles
OSANO Hiroshi, INOUE Tohru
International economic review 32 ( 3 ) 669 - 688 1991
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IMPLICIT CONTRACTS AND REPUTATIONS
OSANO HIROSHI
The Economic Studies Quarterly 40 ( 2 ) 109 - 121 1989
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Involuntary Unemployments and Organizational Inefficiency
Osano Hiroshi
The Hikone ronso ( 218 ) p91 - 105 1983.1
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Incentive Contracts Under Asymmetric Information
Osano Hiroshi
Osaka Daigaku keizaigaku = The Economic review of Osaka University 30 ( 1 ) 32 - 46 1980.6