論文 - 小佐野 広
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Information production in start-up firms: SPACs vs. Traditional IPOs 査読あり
Keiichi Hori and Hiroshi Osano
Journal of Corporate Finance 85 2024年4月
担当区分：責任著者
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Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion 査読あり
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 111 2020年2月
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© 2019 Elsevier B.V. We explore how the timings of compensation payments and contract terminations are jointly determined in a continuous-time principal–agent model under the discretionary termination policy of investors (the principal) when the manager (agent) has loss–averse preferences. Our theoretical findings provide several new empirical implications for backloaded compensation and forced managerial turnover. Our model also shows that mandatory deferral regulation governing incentive pay induces investors to terminate the contract relation earlier and results in the more frequent replacement of managers.
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Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW 68 ( 4 ) 521 - 554 2017年12月
共著
出版者・発行元：WILEY
Given that an owner lacks the ability to commit to his or her timing decisions under a manager's hidden action, we consider the optimal design of the contract and the owner's optimal timing decisions. Using a real options approach, we show that, compared with the full commitment case, a higher (lower)-quality project is launched later than (at the same time as) the first-best case, whereas the replacement of the manager is (is not necessarily) made later if the hidden-action problem is severe enough (is not severe enough). Severance pay may serve to minimize the compensation for the manager's loss of corporate control.
DOI： 10.1111/jere.12144
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Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 29 607 - 627 2014年12月
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出版者・発行元：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
This paper considers what kind of managerial compensation contract is optimal for mitigating the moral hazard decision regarding investment timing. We examine the situation where the personal objectives of managers do not align with those of shareholders and where there is the possibility of project liquidation but where managerial compensation is endogenously determined. Using a real options approach, we show that restricted stock is optimal relative to stock options under various circumstances. However, we also suggest that stock options are more likely to be used instead of, or in addition to, restricted stock in firms with new debt financing and more impatient managers, diversified firms involving more complicated business activities, and firms with weaker corporate governance. In addition, we find that project start-up is more likely to be deterred by the greater likelihood of project liquidation and larger managerial effort cost, whereas the amount of stock-based managerial compensation is independent of the probability of liquidation but is increasing in managerial effort cost. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model (vol 26, pg 2620, 2013)
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 27 ( 12 ) 3699 - 3701 2014年12月
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Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 26 ( 10 ) 2620 - 2647 2013年10月
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出版者・発行元：OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC
We explore a continuous-time agency model with double moral hazard. Using a venture capitalist (VC)-entrepreneur relationship where the VC both supplies costly effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public offering (IPO), we show that optimal IPO timing is earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard. Our results also indicate that the manager's compensation tends to be paid earlier under double moral hazard. We derive several comparative static results, notably that IPO timing is earlier when the need for monitoring by the VC is smaller and when the volatility of cash flows is larger.
DOI： 10.1093/rfs/hht027
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Nonrecourse financing and securitization
Mami Kobayashi, Hiroshi Osano
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 21 ( 4 ) 659 - 693 2012年10月
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出版者・発行元：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
We consider the role of the nonrecourse financing of securitization by a financial institution (FI). Our model suggests that even though the FI has the opportunity to provide liquidity support afterward, it is optimal for the FI to use the nonrecourse financing of securitization initially, because the nonrecourse security makes liquidation of the original asset more attractive for an Fl that knows that the original asset is bad. However, our model also predicts that the nonrecourse financing of securitization, together with short-term maturity financing, forces the financial system to perform inefficiently in handling troubled loans and causes problems with inefficient liquidity support and overinvestment under certain conditions, despite the nonrecourse property of securitization. The theoretical results provide empirical implications for recent problems with securitized and structured finance in the United States and Europe. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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The new main bank system
Mami Kobayashi, Hiroshi Osano
JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES 25 ( 3 ) 336 - 354 2011年9月
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出版者・発行元：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Kobayashi, Mami, and Osano, Hiroshi-The new main bank system
We develop a main bank model where the main bank decides whether or not to raise additional funds from the capital market to continue to invest in a borrowing firm when nonmain banks withdraw funds. We show that the threat of withdrawal of nonmain banks is more likely to force the main bank to perform efficiently in handling troubled loans, thereby preventing problems with zombie firms, if the potential cash flow (liquidation value) of the firm decreases (increases) relative to the amount funded by nonmain banks. The theoretical results provide both efficiency evaluations for the renewal of the main bank relation in Japan after the end of the 1990s and empirical implications for the renewed main bank system. J. Japanese Int. Economies xxx (xx) (2011) xxx-xxx. Faculty of Economics, Kindai University, Japan; Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. -
Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources
Hiroshi Osano
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 167 ( 2 ) 202 - 223 2011年6月
単著
出版者・発行元：J C B MOHR
This paper considers the role of equity transfer to strategic alliance partners in mitigating the moral-hazard problem that occurs if a participating firm faces some possibility of reallocating a part of the resources devoted to the joint project of the strategic alliance or retreating from the strategic alliance before completing the joint project. I derive a situation in which equity transfer in the strategic alliance is a component of an optimal contract, in particular, in which equity transfer in the strategic alliance is superior to the contract with the cash transfer only. I also analyze optimal equity stake sizes.
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Incentive Transfer Schemes with Marketable and Nonmarketable Public Services
Nobuo Akai, Keizo Mizuno, Hiroshi Osano
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 166 ( 4 ) 614 - 640 2010年12月
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出版者・発行元：J C B MOHR
We examine an incentive transfer scheme in an executive agency system when there are both marketable and nonmarketable public services. We show that because of the incentive transfer scheme, which contributes to the elimination of a government's budget deficit, social welfare is higher in the executive agency system than in a traditional system when the shadow cost of public funds is large. In addition, the scheme is desirable from a welfare viewpoint when the marketable and nonmarketable public services are complements, or when the production technology exhibits a high degree of cost complementarity. (JEL: H 11, L 32)
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Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems
Hori Keiichi, Osano Hiroshi
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL 33 ( 12 ) 1962 - 1980 2009年12月
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Reforming corporate Governance and Employment Relations
Mami Kobayashi, Kindai University, Hiroshi Osano
Employment Relations: Changing Scenario, Bharti Thakor ed (ed.) 2008年
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証券化,内部モニタリング, 金融市場
小佐野広
Ruud. A. I. van Frederikslust, James S. Ang and Sudi Sudarsanam (eds.) Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance, Routledge Books, 2007 2007年
単著
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On Executive Agency Systems
Keizo Mizuno, ansei Gakuin University, Nobuo Akai, Osaka Unuiversity, Hiroshi Osano
Osaka Economic Papers, Vol.55, pp.153-159 2005年
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Double moral hazard and renegotiation
H. Osano, M. Kobayashi
Research in Economics 59 ( 4 ) 345 - 364 2005年
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Optimal Scheme of Injection of Public Funds Under Moral Hazard Incentive for Banks
Hiroshi Osano
The Japanese Economic Review, Vol.56, pp.223-247 2005年
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Reformong Corporate Governance and employment Relations
Mami Kobayashi, Kinki University, Hiroshi Osano
Japan Labor Review, Vol.2, pp. 58-80 2005年
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