Papers - NAKAGAWA Shintaro
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Economic Theory Invited International coauthorship
Nakagawa, Shintaro, Ihori, Toshihiro, McGuire, Martin C.
Research Handbook on NATO 52 - 68 2023
Authorship：Lead author, Corresponding author Publisher：Edward Elgar Publishing
This chapter offers an overview of the economic theory of NATO. A significant area of the economic theory is the empirical verification and theoretical expansion of the model initially proposed by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). This chapter provides an overview of their model and presents a review of the existing literature examining the empirical evidence supporting the model. Furthermore, this chapter presents a review of the existing literature concerning the extensions of the original model, namely the joint-product and impure public defense models. Another extension of the original model is the multidimensional decomposition of the benefit derived from the defense, which is also addressed in this chapter.
Other Link： https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=cLLLEAAAQBAJ
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Shintaro Nakagawa
60 ( 3・4 ) 93 - 122 2020.3
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On the Maximum Number of Players Voluntarily Contributing to Two or More Public Goods
( 92719 ) 2019.3
Single Work
Cornes and Itaya (2010) showed that in a two-player game of voluntary provision of two public goods if the players have different preferences, and if both players simultaneously make positive contributions to both public goods, the system of equations representing the Nash equilibrium is overdetermined. We extend this proposition to a model of voluntary provision of two or more public goods and show that if the players have different preferences, and if the number of players who contribute simultaneously to two or more public goods is more than the number of public goods, the system representing the Nash equilibrium is overdetermined. This result implies that in a large group, the share of players contributing to multiple public goods may well be quite small and the majority of the players may contribute to at the most one public good.
Other Link： https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/92719
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International Security, Multiple Public Good Provisions, and The Exploitation Hypothesis Reviewed
Ihori T, McGuire M, Nakagawa S.
Defence and Peace Economics 25 ( 3 ) 213 - 229 2014
Joint Work
Publisher：TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
Since the 1960s Olson-Zeckhauser's (1966) analysis, its 'exploitation of the great by the small' has provided economists' core model of alliance's provision of security/defense. But with the end of the Cold War, countries' allocative behavior has diverged markedly from OZ's predictions for defense as a homogeneous pure public good voluntarily provided. This paper suggests a replacement for OZ, with the essential difference that 'defense' rather than being aggregated into their single public good is disaggregated into more realistic categories of self-insurance and self-protection. Because allocative behavior in public good groups is essentially driven by income effects, we concentrate on these, which become complex and conflicted, giving much greater scope for goods-inferiority. The analysis is followed by numerical simulations, which conform to actual experienced allocations in NATO much better than the conventional 'exploitation' model.
DOI： 10.1080/10242694.2012.752229
Other Link： http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8567-8165
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Environment, growth, and technological change in a two-country overlapping-generations model Reviewed
Nakagawa S, Sato M, Yamaguchi R.
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 16 ( 4 ) 397 - 443 2014
Joint Work
Publisher：Springer-Verlag Tokyo
This paper investigates the effects of a change in environmental abatement technology on the accumulation of capital stock and on the global environment in a two-country overlapping-generations model. Among other issues, we focus on a situation where abatement improves in only one country. With comparative static analysis, we derive the sufficient and necessary condition in the initial steady states for unilateral improvement in abatement technology to improve the two-country global environment. In addition, we examine the effects of changes in several technologies on capital stock and on the global environment.
DOI： 10.1007/s10018-014-0078-x
Other Link： http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8567-8165
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Overall Picture and Structure of the Fiscal Economic Model
Nobutoshi Kitaura, Junji Ueda, Shintaro Nakagawa, Daisuke Nishino, Tatsuya Sugiura, Kun Kawaguchi, Motokazu Sakamura, Tetsutaro Ohmatsu, Noriyoshi Nagumo, Syohei Yohtani,Takuto Nagashima, Kensaku Morita, Tatsuo Sakamoto, Ryo Ishida, Takaki Hojo, Yoko Masui
Public Policy Review 7 ( 2 ) 175 - 298 2011.7
Joint Work
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Structure of the Forward-looking Model of the Japanese Economy and Simulation Results
Daisuke Ishikawa, Nobutoshi Kitaura, Junji Ueda, Shintaro Nakagawa
Public Policy Review 7 ( 2 ) 385 - 454 2011.7
Joint Work
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Global Public Goods and Global Order : Rethinking Excludability
中川 真太郎
経済論叢 185 ( 1 ) 17 - 32 2011.1
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Alliance Formation and Better-Shot Global Public Goods: Theory and Simulation Reviewed
Shintaro Nakagawa, Makoto Sejima and Shigeru Fujimoto
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 6 ( 2 ) 201 - 225 2010.3
Joint Work
Authorship：Lead author
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フォワード型マクロ経済モデルの構造とシミュレーション結果 (特集 マクロ計量モデル)
石川 大輔, 北浦 修敏, 上田 淳二，中川真太郎
フィナンシャル・レビュー 2010 ( 2 ) 210 - 254 2010.3
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Pricing and investment of cross-border transport infrastructure Reviewed
Mun S.-I, Nakagawa S.
Regional Science and Urban Economics 40 ( 4 ) 228 - 240 2010
Joint Work
Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
We develop a simple two-country model of international trade in which the transportation cost between countries is endogenously determined by pricing and investment decisions of cross-border transport infrastructure. We evaluate alternative regimes of pricing and investment, i.e., free access (e.g., public road), pricing by two governments, and private operation. We also examine the effect of integrating operation. It is shown that investment rule in free access regime is inefficient. On the other hand, the investment rule is efficient if infrastructure charge is levied either by the government or by the private operators. We obtain the welfare ranking of alternative regimes under specific functional form, show how the welfare results depend on pricing policies. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
DOI： 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2010.03.008
Other Link： http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8567-8165
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Cross-border transport infrastructure and aid policies Reviewed
Mun S.-I, Nakagawa S.
Annals of Regional Science 42 ( 2 ) 465 - 486 2008
Joint Work
Publisher：SPRINGER
We investigate resource allocation concerning the provision of cross-border transport infrastructure, which is used for trade of goods between two neighboring countries. Since the level of infrastructure is sub-optimal under the circumstances that two governments choose the levels of infrastructure independently, we focus on the role of foreign aid to improve the efficiency of infrastructure provision. In this paper, we examine the welfare effects of aid policies, and show that aid can make both countries better off, i.e., Pareto improvement. Furthermore, Pareto improvement is more likely if the stage of development in recipient country is very low or sufficiently high.
DOI： 10.1007/s00168-007-0169-8
Other Link： http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8567-8165
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Weaker-link公共財の自発的供給下における個人間資金移転の効果
中川 真太郎
2005.3
Single Work